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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought in the District Court of
Salt Lake County by plaintiff, Walker Bank and Trust
Company, against the defendant W. S. Brimhall, as
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Utah, <hereinafter generally referred to as Bank Commissioner, or
Commissioner) to review a decision of the Bank Commissioner denying plaintiff's application for a branch
bank to be located in South Ogden, Utah. The action is
authorized by Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
The several defendant banks, who were protestants
in the proceedings before the Bank Commissioner, intervened as parties defendant.
1

.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff's motion For surnrnmy judgment \\as
granted by Judge Ste\\'art M. 1 f anson in <l Memorandum
Decision in \Hi ting under elate of March 18, 1
Thereafter, and on March 20, 1969, Judge 1 lanson signed a11 d
entered his Declaratory Judgment ancl Decree \\hcrciiy
he ( 1) set aside the Eank Cummissioner\ decision cleming pl0intiff the branch in South Ogden, and (2)
"ordered and directed (the Bank Commissioner) to gr:int
the application of plaintiff * * * for the establishment
of a branch bank in the City of South Ogden."
The Findings, Conclusions and Order of the Bank
Commissioner denying plaintiff's application, with the
Opinion of the Attorney General appended thereto, and
the judgment of the lower court are set out in the appendix hereto.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
All defendants have joined in this appeal and join
in this common brief. They seek to have the judgment
of the lower court reversed, the order granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment set aside, plaintiff's action
dismissed, or in the alternative, the case reinstated in the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basic facts are not in dispute. Essentially they
are set out in the Commissioner's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order" ( R. 5), and in the opinion of the
Attorney General of Utah appended thereto <R. 8).
Additionally, the lower court received into evidence the
transcript of the testimony in the hearings before the
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Con11111ss1oner ond transcript references herein refer to
such transcript. The exhibits in the hearing before the
Commissioner were not before the lower court, but
certain thereof are included in the record on appeal by
stipulation of the parties. When referred to herein they
a1·c designated as Applicant's (Plaintiff) or Protestant's
(Dcicndants) exhibits.
Ogden City is a city of the second class, with a population of approximately 75,000. South Ogden City, a
city of the third class with a population of approximately
7,500 adjoins Ogden on the south. Thirty-sixth Street,
running east and west, is the dividing line between the
two municipalities, and Washington Boulevard is the
main street running north and south through both South
Ogden and Ogden. There is no city of the first class in
Weber County.
On March 21, 1968, plaintiff, a state banking corporation with its principal office in Salt Lake City, filed
its application with the Bank Commissioner for leave to
establish a branch bank in South Ogden at a location on
Washington Boulevard near 36th Street. Thus the proposed location was at the extreme northerly edge of South
Ogden, and immediately adjacent to the south boundary
of Ogden.
At this time Ogden had five unit banks located
within its corporate limits, -Bank of Utah, Bank of Ben
Lomond, Citizens National Bank, First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A., and Commercial Security Bank. In addition,
First Security Bank and Commercial Security Bank each
had a branch situated in Ogden. South Ogden had no
unit banks located within its corporate limits, but Bank

3

of Utah, First Security Bank and Commercial Security
Bank each had and have a branch located therein.
Written protests to the application were filed by the
five Ogden banks (all appellants herein), and the application was duly noticed by the Commissioner for public
hearing. At the commencement of the hearing, appellants objected to the granting of the application upon
the grounds that the primary objective of the proposed
branch was not to serve South Ogden, where it was to
be located, but rather to serve Ogden, where it was prohibited by law from locating, and that the granting of
the application under such circumstances would be contrary to law. Similar objections were interposed by appellants at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, and again
at the close of all the evidence. The Bank Commissioner
took the objections under advisement, stating that he
would seek the opinion of the Attorney General upon the
legal question involved.
Subsequently the Commissioner found as facts, the
following matters here deemed pertinent:
Plaintiff is one of the oldest and largest state chartered banks in Utah. Its main office is in Salt Lake City,
and it has twelve branches in Salt Lake County. Additionally, it has branches in Price, Provo and Logan.
(Finding 7, App. II>.
Plaintiff has capital to the amount required by statute for each present branch, and the additional amount
required for the proposed branch. (Finding 9, App. Ill.
The economic effect of the proposed branch and its
sources of business would encompass the Ogden Metropolitan Area, which is comprised of Weber County and
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Nzirth Davis County, including both incorporated and
unincorporated areas therein. The Ogden Metropolitan
Area is, for many purposes, a single economic and trade
area, with Ogden as its major city. The area has experienced considerable economic growth over the past several years, and growth of the economy is likely to continue. (finding 16, !\pp. IV).
Unit banks exist in the Ogden Metropolitan Area in
the municipalities of Ogden, Clearfield, Layton and Kaysville. Additionally, one or more branch banks are established in each of the municipalities of Ogden, North
Ogden, South Ogden, Washington Terrace, Riverdale,
Roy, Sunset, Clearfield, Syracuse and Layton (a total of
fourteen branch banks), plus banking facilities at Hill
Air force Base and Ogden Defense Depot. The established banks and branches are financially sound and
secure, and the establishment of new banks and branches
in recent years has not prevented all banks from increasing their loans
resources. (Finding 11, App. ID.
The proposed branch would supply the full range
of banking services and would offer services to plaintiff's
customers in facilitating inter-branch and between city
banking transactions. (Finding 12, App. HO.
Plaintiff bank has a number of existing customers
in the Ogden Metropolitan Area. (finding 14, App. IID.
The financial condition and history of plaintiff and
its management demonstrate its capacity to successfully
manage and operate the proposed branch. (finding 15,
App. III).
The Ogden Metropolitan Area has a population per
banking office of 8,333 persons, compared with 6,247 for
the state as a whole. (Conclusion 3, App. IV).
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The public convenience and advantage would be
subserved and promoted by the establishment of the
branch at the location proposed, and the general public
would be afforded the choice of another banking facility
with substantially larger lending limits than any other
state bank in the area. (Conclusion 4, App. V).
The Commissioner further found that it was the
contention of protestants that the establishment of the
proposed branch would circumvent the branch banking
law, because the primary objective of plaintiff in seeking
a South Ogden location was not to serve the needs cind
convenience of South Ogden, but rather to provide a
facility that would compete with the banks in Ogden
City. (Finding 17, App. IV).
That the Attorney General of Utah in an opm1on
to the Commissioner dated August 15, 1968, had ruled
that as a matter of law a branch bank could not be established by applicant at the location proposed, and that he
(the Commissioner) deemed it proper to deny the application upon the basis of the Attorney General's opinion
(Conclusion 5, App. V).
Additionally, there was direct testimony on behalf
of plaintiff through its economist, J. Whitney Hanh,
that the establishment of the proposed branch in South
Ogden would serve the needs and convenience of the
Ogden Metropolitan Area and in a broader sense, the
needs and convenience of the entire Wasatch front. (Tr.
73, 74, 76, 77, App. Ex. 1, Pg. 65). He further testified,
the statutes notwithstanding (Tr. 79), that the public
convenience and advantage is better served through
branch banks than through unit banks, and that the
state generally will benefit more from the establishment
6
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of new branches of already established banks, than from
the establishment of new unit banks. <Tr. 80, 84, 85,
App. Ex. 1, Pg. 68).
Also, that plaintiff had made no economic study of
the needs or convenience of South Ogden, as South Ogden's needs were deemed "irrelevant" <Tr. 89) and that
"realistically" plaintiff was looking beyond South Ogden
(Tr. 120).
No finding was made by the Commissioner that the
needs and convenience of that portion of the public comprising South Ogden would be in any way advantaged
by the establishment of the proposed branch within its
corporate limits. Indeed the evidence showed, and the
Commissioner found, that South Ogden, a city of 7,500
population, was already being served by three branch
banks within its limits, and was immediately adjacent to
Ogden with its five unit banks and two additional branch
banks. (Finding 11, App. II, Applicant's Exhibit I,
Pg. 57).
Following the conclusion of the hearings before the
Bank Commissioner and in conformity with his statement that he would seek the advice of the Attorney General upon the legal question raised by the protesting
banks, the Commissioner submitted to the Attorney General the following question:
"Should the Commissioner of Utah Financial Institutions find that the public convenience and
advantage would not be subverted, may a branch
bank be lawfully established within the corporate
limits of South Ogden, Utah, a city of the second
class in which no unit bank is located, but which
is immediately adjacent to Ogden, Utah, another
city of the second class in which are presently
7

located five unit banks, where it is shown by the
evidence that the primary objective of the branch
bank is not to serve South Ogden, Utah, in which
it is physically to be located, but rather to serve
Ogden, Utah?" (Emphasis added).
The written opinion of the Attorney General <Phil
L. Hansen) in response to such question was released
under date of August 15, 1968, and on September 9.
1968, the Bank Commissioner issued his decision in writing denying plaintiff's application for the branch. The
opinion of the Attorney General was referred to in the
decision as the basis for the decision, and was appended
to the decision. (App. VO.
Thereafter, plaintiff brought this action in the lower
court for a "review" of the decision as provided under
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953. After issue was joined by
all parties, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which
motion was granted and summary judgment entered on
March 20, 1969, in favor of plaintiff and against defendants. (R. 67). By such judgment (which is set out in
full at page IX of the Appendix hereto) the lower court
decreed ( 1) that the decision of the Bank Commissioner
was unlawful and was set aside, and (2) that the Bank
Commissioner is ordered and directed to grant the application of plaintiff for the South Ogden branch.
ARGUMENT
1. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION
REPRESENTS SOUND LAW, AND THE
BANK COMMISSIONER'S DECISION, BEING
BASED THEREON, WAS NOT CONTRARY
TO LAW.
8
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At the outset, we point out that Section 7-1-26,
U.C.A. 1953, \vhich vests the lmver court with the power
to "review" decisions of the Bank Commissioner, limits
the power of the court as follows:
"The reviewing court shall have power to hold
unlawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling
of the bank commissioner found to be arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not
in accordance with law."
Thus the power of the lower court is limited to setting
aside a decision of the bank commissioner found to be not
in accordance with law.
It is unfortunate that the judgment of the lower
court with which we are here concerned, while determining that the decision of the Bank Commissioner was "not
in accordance with law", does not specify how, or by virtue of what circumstance, such decision was contrary to
law. However, since the only contention of the plaintiff
in the lovvert court was that the Bank Commissioner's
decision was wrong because it was based upon the Attorney General's opinion, which opinion plaintiff claimed
was not legally sound, we assume that the decision of
the lower court is based upon this same reasoning. We,
accordingly, present as our first point of argument our
contention that the Attorney General's opinion represents sound law. To do this we first consider the applicable statutes pertaining to branch banking.
APPLICABLE STATUTES
Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides
as follows:
"The business of every bank shall be conducted
only at its banking house and every bank shall
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receive deposits and pay checks only at its banking house except as hcreinaf ter provided.
"With the consent of the bank commissioner any
bank having a paid-in capital and surplus of not
less than $60,000 may establish and operate one
branch for the transaction of its business; provided, that for each additional branch established
there shall be paid in an additional $60,000 (capital and surplus).
"All banking houses and branches shall be located
either within the corporate limits of a city or town,
or within unincorporated areas of a county in
which a city of the first class is located.
"Except in cities of the first class, or within unincorporated areas of a county in which a city of the
first class is located, no branch bank shall be established in any city or town in which is located a
bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting a customary banking business, unless the
bank seeking to establish such branch shall take
over an existing bank. No unit bank organized

and operating at a point where there are other
operating banks, state or national, shall be permitted to be acquired by another bank for the
purpose of establishing a branch until such bank
shall have been in operation as such for a period
of five years.
"The term 'branch' as used in this act shall be
held to include any branch bank, branch office,
branch agency, additional office, or any branch
place of business at which deposits are received
or checks paid or money lent.
"Any bank desiring to establish one or more
branches or offices shall file a written application
therefor in such form and containing such information as the bank commissioner may reasonably
require. No bank shall be permitted to establish
IO

_.

any branch or office until it shall first have been
shown to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner that the public convenience and advantage
will he subserved and promoted by the establishment of such branch or office. The bank commissioner may, at his discretion, hold a public hearing on any application to establish a branch. He
shall give notice of such hearing by publication in
three successive issues in a newspaper of general
circulation in the County in which the branch is
to be established. The decision of the bank commissioner granting or denying an application to
establish a branch shall be in writing, stating the
reasons therefore, and shall be mailed to the applicant and all protestants. The bank commissioner may by order permitting the establishment
of such branch or office designate and limit the
character of work and service which may therein
be performed.
"No branch shall be established at a location outside the corporate limits of a city or town in such
close proximity to an established bank or branch
as to unreasonably interfere with the business
thereof.
"Any corporation or officer thereof violating any
of the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor." Utalics reflect the provisions which
\Ve deem particularly applicable to the question at
hand.)
Section 7-3-6.3, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides as follows:
"From and after the effective date of this act no
unit bank and no branch bank shall be established
or authorized to conduct a banking business except as hereinbefore in Section 7-3-6 expressly
provided."
11

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In the case of Walker Banh & Trus[ Company vs.
Taylor, 15 Utah (2) 234, 390 P. (2) 592, this court made
the following observation with respect to the prohibiti\'c
effect of the foregoing statutes, and their legislative history:
"We arc of the opinion that our statute is restrictive and, what it does not expressly permit, it prohibits. There is but one method of establishing a
branch bank in a city of less than the first class
having an existing unit bank and that is by 'taking over' such bank. The legislative history of
branch banking is of great significance. In 1911,
the legislature enacted a statute which absolutely
prohibited branch banking. It was not until 1933
that the legislature relaxed this prohibition and
permitted branching under certain conditions and
circumstances. During the period between 191 J
and 1933 the legislature evidently was of the
opinion that branch banking was not in the puh-

lic interest, possibly because it might impair the
stability of the existing banks. This reasoning
could well have infl,uenced the law makers when
they saw fit to allow branch banking, but only
under certain restrictive conditions. The legislative history lends support to the proposition that
what our branch banking laws do not permit they
prohibit." <Italics added.)

EFFECT AND OBJECTIVE OF STATUTES
By the foregoing statutes the legislature has affirmatively declared that only certain specified geographical
areas are open to the establishment of branch banks, other
than by the so-called "take over" method with \Yhich \\"C
are not here concerned. With the exception of Salt Lake
County and Salt Lake City, as to which the lcgisbture
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has established different rules not applicable here, the
geographical areas not automatically closed to branching are municipalities in which there are no unit banks.
Or to state it in the negative, all unincorporated areas of
the counties, and all municipalities in which are presently
located a unit bank or banks, are closed to the establishment of branch banks. The Legislature has further
affirmatively declared it to be the policy of Utah that as
the public comprising the closed municipalities require
additional bank facilities, such additional needs are to be
provided through the establishment of new unit banks,
and not by means of branching. Thus the legislative policy of Utah, as reflected in the foregoing statutory restrictions on branch banking, is one of encouraging the unit
banking system and discouraging branch banking. This
policy, as pointed out by the Attorney General in his
opinion, serves a dual purpose, in that it is designed to
protect existing unit banks from the competition of outof-city banks through the branching process, and to promote the furnishing of additional banking competition
through the establishment of local unit banks. The reasoning behind such policy is as suggested by this Court
in Walker Bank & Trust Co. vs. Taylor, supra, namely,
that unlimited branch banking
"was not in the public interest, possibly because
it might impair the stability of the existing banks."
PLAINTIFF WALKER BANK'S APPLICATION
Ogden City, a city of the second class, has five unit
banks established and located within its corporate limits.
Thus Ogden City is closed to de novo branching. Plaintiff sought permission to establish a branch in South
Ogden, a city of the third class which adjoins Ogden on
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the south, and which presently has thre2 branch banks
located and established within its corporate limits, but no
unit bank or banks. Thus South Ogden is not closed to
the establishment of the proposed branch if it is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Bank Commissioner that
the needs and convenience of South Ogden require aclditional banking facilities. However. that is not this case,
and it does not involve the question upon which the
Attorney General's opinion was based, as plaintiff's e\'idence by plaintiff's own admission was not directed toward the needs and convenience of South Ogden.
Thus, the legal question involved became one of
whether the law permitted Walker Bank to establish :i
branch in South Ogden, based not upon the needs and
requirements of South Ogden, or with the primary objective of serving South Ogden, but rather upon the basis
of a claimed need for additional banking services in Ogden and other closed areas in Weber and North
County, and with the primary objective of serving and
fulfilling those asserted needs.
This was the legal question submitted by the Commissioner to the Attorney General, and in response to
which the Attorney General ruled that Utah law does
not permit the establishment of the proposed branch
under such circumstances.
We concur in such opinion, and submit that any
other view must literally result in the destruction of the
Utah legislative policy designed to protect unit banks
from the competition of de novo branches. Ogden City
provide1s a prime example, as it is adjoined on the north
by North Ogden, and on the south by South Ogden,
-with branch banks in both, but no unit banks in either.
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A view contrary to the Attorney General's ruling would
permit Ogden to be surrounded by branch banks located
adjacent to it but in the adjoining incorporated areas, and
justified only on their ability to serve Ogden City where
they are prohibited from branching. Such a subversion
of the legislative restrictions on branch banking must be
of necessity unlawful.
Plaintiff's entire case in the lower court rested upon
its contention that where what it referred to as the "statutory requirements" are found to exist, then the applicant has the right to establish the branch as a matter of
law. The statutory requirements, or criteria, claimed by
plDintiff to gi\·e rise to this right are (I) adequate capital
and surplus, (2) that the branch be located in a municipality in which there is no unit bank, and (3) that public convenience and advantage would be served by its
establishment. This, likewise, must have been the conclusion of the lower court in the light of its judgment
that the decision of the Bank Commissioner was "not in
accordance with law'', and in ordering the Bank Commissioner as a matter of law to grant the application.
On the other hand, the defendants contend, and this
is the thrust of the Attorney General's opinion, that the
exi<;tence of these criteria do not give rise to a right to
establish a branch, but rather that they are factors that
must exist as conditions precedent to the approval of a
branch. In other words, if any of the criteria do not
exist, the statute itself closes the door to the proposed
branch. On the other hand, where the criteria are shown
to exist, the discretionary approval by the Bank Commissioner is still required. This discretionary approval by
the Bank Commissioner is in a sense a fourth criteria.
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This is obvious from even a casual reading of the statute
(Section 7-3-6). With respect to capital it provides:
"With the consent of the bank commissioner any
bank having a paid in capital and surplus of not
less than $60,000 may establish and operate one
branch for the transaction of its business; provided
that for each additional branch established there
shall be paid in an additional $60,000 capital and
surplus." <Emphasis added.)

Thus the key words there are "With the consent of
the bank commissioner".
With respect to location, the statute provides:
" ... no branch shall be established in any city or
town in which is located a bank or banks ... ''
The significance here is the negative approach. No
branch may be established in a municipality where there
is a unit bank. Nowhere does the statute provide, other
than with the consent of the Bank Commissioner, that
branches shall be permitted in municipalities in which
there are no unit banks.
And finally the statute provides:
"No bank shall be permitted to establish any
branch or office until it shall first have been shown
to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner that
the public convenience and advantage will be subserved and promoted by the establishment of such
branch or office."
Here again is the prohibitive approach. Without
convenience and advantage the branch may not be established. Convenience and advantage is a condition precedent to the bank commissioner's approval, but its mere
existence does not give rise to a right to such approval.
Obviously where the initial three criteria are shown to
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exist the bank comm1ss1oner may not arbitrarily withhold his approval, but our point is, and this is the essence
of the Attorney General's opinion, that where it is additionally shown that the primary objective of the proposed location is not to serve the area where it is to be
located, but rather to serve an adjoining area which the
legislature has declared to be off-limits to branching, then
the bank commissioner has not only the right, but also
the duty to withhold his approval, and such withholding
of approval cannot be said to be "contrary to law".
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SCHEMES TO EVADE
BRANCH POLICY
The laws relating to branch banking vary from state
to state. Some states permit unlimited branch banking.
Others prohibit it entirely. The majority, like Utah, permit it subject to limitations and restrictions, which limitations and restrictions vary from state to state.
The merits of one policy as compared to another is
open to debate, as evidenced by unlimited branching in
some states and complete prohibition in others. However, we are not here concerned with varying philosophies
upon the subject, but only with applying the law as it
exists in Utah, to the end of meeting the objectives of
the legislature. As stated by this court in Walker Bank
& Trust Co. vs. Taylor, supra,
"It is acknowledged that the State has the right
and prerogative to regulate banks and banking
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the disposition
of the problem must be resolved by the interpretation of the applicable statutory law relating
thereto."
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And further in the same case:
"We are of the opinion that our statute is restrictive and, what it does not expressly permit, it prohibits."
In the light of the varying philosophies as to the
merits of liberal branching policies as compared to restrictive branching policies, it is not surprising that schemes
designed to evade state branching law from time to time
develop, but the Courts that have h'.d occasion to cnnsider such schemes invariably recognize them for wh;1t i
they <lfC and Strike them d0\Yl1. ror c;;amplc. in one
Marion National Bank v. Camp, April 5, I 968 ( unreported, but a copy of the decision had been filed with the
Clerk of this Court), a bank sought to "move" its principal office approximately 12 miles to a location where '
it could not legally establish a branch and to retain its
former office as a branch. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that:
!

"This Court cannot permit the legislative scheme
to be emasculated by an arid emphasis on such
terms as 'branch' and 'main office' without regard
to the legislative purpose which these terms were
really intended to express. The clear preponderance of evidence in this case is that the plan which
Van Buren Bank and the Comptroller characterize as a 'relocation' of the 'main office' in Marion
coupled with a 'branch' into Van Buren is in fact
intended as a subterfuge for what is essentially an
attempt by an established bank in Van Buren, Indiana, to establish a branch in Marion.

*

*

*

*

... the court finds that the plan is contrary to the
legislative policy of Indiana ...

"' * * *

... The plan . . was clearly intended to and docs
circumvent the relevant Indiana statute ..
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* * * *

It is therefore CONSIDERED, ORDERED, DECREED AND DECLARED that the proposed
(plan) . . . is, and would be illegal and unlawful . . ,,
Similarly, in striking down the application of a
Michigan bank to establish a branch just across the street
from a village but purportedly in a "new area", the U.
S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (American
Bank & Trust Company v. Saxon, 373 F<2> 283, <1967)
stated:
"It takes little imagination to be aware that the
Dart bank moved across the street, not to serve the
separate village, but to be immediately adjacent
to the new Holt Shopping Center ... "

Bank of Dearborn vs. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 294, 373
Fed. <2> 283, involved a situation where the Comptroller
of the Currency approved an application by Manufacturers National B8.nk to establish a new branch in the
County just across the boundary from Dearborn, and in
close proximity to an existing branch of Manufacturers'
Nation;il Bank. Concurrently, the Comptroller approved
an application to "move" the existing branch to a new
location which was not open to de novo branching under
Michigon lo.w. Protesting unit banks in Dearborn contended that the two proposals taken together constituted
a subterfuge and evasion of Michigan law, and that the
Comptroller abused his discretion in approving them.
said:

In agreeing with this contention, the District Court
"Maybe the laws should be amended to permit the
utmost flexibility in branch banking. Maybe they
should not. Congressional debate on this issue has
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gone on for years. But it is not for defendant
Saxon and defendant bank to amend our 'anti- '
quated' laws by clever devices of evasion, ... "
In re Princeton Bank & Trust Company <N. ].> 208
A. (2) 820 involved a novel scheme which the Superior

Court of New Jersey held to be but a subterfuge designed
to circumvent New Jersey branch banking laws.

Princeton Bank had its principal office in the municipality of Princeton, and a branch in Princetown Township (County). It desired to establish another branch in
the county, but was precluded by New Jersey law from
so doing because its principal office was in Princeton
municipality. It accordingly (and this was legal under
New Jersey law) changed its principal location to the
premises in the County occupied by its existing branch,
and changed the location of its branch to the premises
formerly occupied by the main office. It was then free to
seek the additional branch, which it did. First National
Bank of Princeton appealed from the decision of the
Commissioner of Banking granting the application. We
quote from the decision of the Court reversing the Commissioner of Banking:
"First National's principal contentions on this appeal are that ( 1) Trust Company's actions were
merely a device to circumvent the branch bank
limitations of the Banking Act of 1948, as
amended (N.J.S.A. 17:9A-l et seq.) and (2) the
Commissioner's findings that Trust Company had
met the requirements of N.J.S.A. 17:9A-20 are not
supported by substantial evidence and should be
reversed."

* * * *

"We come, then, to the first of the two main arguments projected by First National, namely, that
20

Trust Company's actions were a subterfuge and a
device for circumventing our banking laws, and
that there was not a bona fide transfer of its principal office to Princeton Township.
"Standing in isolation and away from the realities
of what actually happened, the interchange of the
principal and branch offices which Trust Company sought to effect in May 1962 would appear
to be legally unassailable. Its executive committee
had authorized that the principal office be changed
from Nassau Street in Princeton Borough to the
Princeton Shopping Center in Princeton Township, then occupied by its branch office, and that
the Nassau Street Office thereafter be maintained
as a branch office. The necessary certificate of
change was filed with the Department of Banking
and Insurance on May 28, five days later.
<Whether the principal office was actually transferred to the shopping center will shortly be considered.) However, the interchange was but the
first step of a plan which would enable Trust
Company to apply to the Commissioner of Banking and insurance for a branch office at the proposed new site in the northeastern section of
Princeton Township. That application was authorized to be filed with the Department of Banking and Insurance by action of the executive committee taken within the month, on June 20.
"The sequence of events speaks eloquently of
Trust Company's purpose. It had Mr. Cook, the
local realtor, checking the surrounding area for a
possible branch site for some time prior to the actions taken by the executive committee, described
above. He negotiated for the proposed site around
the first of 1962, and the option agreement for the
property was executed in March. President Cosby
had also been investigating the possibilities of the
area. He reported to the bank's board of directors
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regarding 'recent developments' on April 11, 1962.,
at which time the board authorized its executive
committee to resolve the matter of the bank's new
quarters as quickly as possible. Then came the
executive committee's resolution of May 23, 1962,
authorizing the change of the principal office from
the borough to the shopping center in the township, followed soon after by its resolution authorizing the filing of an application with the Commissioner for approval of the new branch office in
the northeastern section of the township.
"We need not base our conclusion that \\'hat Tru<,t
Company did was a device to circumvent the provisions of N.J.S.A. 17:9A-19 on this factual sequence alone. President Cosby, in his testimony
at the Department hearings, candidly admitted
the true purpose of the change. In the course of
his cross-examination he said:
'I knew that under New Jersey law we could
not establish a second branch in the trrn nship without the prior step of moving the
principal office into the township'."

"'

"'

* "'

"What Trust Company could not do directly, it
sought to do indirectly. The Banking Act, and
particularly N.J .S.A. 17 :9A-23, the interchange
provisions, cannot be used to that end."

* * * *

"The determination of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance is accordingly reversed."
The case of Dickinson vs. First National Bank in
Plant City <Sth Cir. Sept. I 2, I 968,J 400 Fed. <2J 548,
involved an off-premises night depository and an 8rmored
car pick-up and delivery service, 8nd the question of
whether the same constituted an illegal branch operation
under Federal and state law. In concluding the operation
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constituted illegal branching, the court commented upon
the defendant's contrary arguments as follows:
"The above analysis by Judge Lindberg represents
an accurate and perceptive application of our
statement of policy in Jackson, and we subscribe
to it without hesitation. We do so on two important grounds.

"First, we cannot aid and abet First National's
attempt to evade the wishes of Congress by an
adroit manipulation of statutory language. Second, we will not choose to overlook state law in
penumbral areas when the thrust of the National
Banking Act is 'competitive equality' between national and state branching authority.
"Congress is in the defining business and is knowledgeable as to how to immunize or deimmunize an
activity from its statutory engulfment. In Section
36 ( f) Congress provided only that the term
'branch' 'shall be held to include' these offices
which engage in the receipt of deposits, the paying of checks, or the lending of money. Such a
provision is hardly adequate as a definition because it merely sets out in general terms what
everyone knows to be the life-blood functions of
banking. If we construed Section 36 <f> as permitting paper evasions from state anti-branching
laws, we would be letting the left hand give and
the right hand take away. Statutory construction
has not fallen to such legalistic depths. We repeat
the words of Judge Gewin, speaking for our Court
en bane, in Miller vs. Amusement Enterprises Inc.,
5 Cir. 1968, 394 F.2d, 342,353:
'We are not only dealing with the language
of the statute, but we must look as well to the
logic of Congress and the broad national policy which was evidenced by its enactment.
Our system does not favor mechanical juris23

prudence; it seeks to find the purpose and
spirit of a statute and the intention of its
makers. Holy Trinity Church vs. United
States, 143 U.S. 457,459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.
Ed. 226,228; National Woodwork Manufacturers Asso. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 87 S. Ct.
1250, 18 L. Ed. 2d 357, 364'." <Italics added.)
We acknowledge that the foregoing cases arc in
many respects factually dissimilar from the one nrnv
under cor:3ideration. However, they are similar one with
the other, and with this case, in that each involves a plan
to evade legislative limitations imposed upon branch
banking. In recognizing these schemes for what they ;ire,
namely, unlawful attempts to evade and frustrate legislative policy restricting branch banking the Courts have
uniformly and without equivocation characterized them
as such, and nullified them.
We are not unmindful of the fact that cases can be
found in which as a result of appropriate planning,
branching restrictions have been avoided. Two such cases
which plaintiff relied upon in the Court below, and
which we assume it will cite to this Court, are First National Bank of Canton vs. Canton Exchange Bank (Miss.)
1963, 156 So. (2) 580, and Application of Howard Savings Institution of Newark <N.J. 1959> 159 Atl. <2J
I I 3. We briefly discuss these two cases at this point.
In the Canton case, Mississippi law permitted Canton Exchange Bank to establish a branch office (which is
different from a branch bank under Mississippi law) in
the County of Madison, outside the town of RidgebiJ,
but not within the corporate limits of Ridgeland. Nevertheless, it established an office in Ridgeland, but when it
discovered its location there was unlawful, it moved the
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office outside the corporate limits and into the County.
This move was approved by the State Comptroller. First
National Bank of Canton sought to enjoin the operation
at the new location, and claimed that the move outside
the corporate limits of Ridgeland was but a maneuver to
circumvent Mississippi law. The Court upheld Canton
Exchange Bank, ruling that approval of the new location
was within the discretion of the Comptroller. We do not
quarrel with the decision, and point out that the necessary ingredient for a contrary decision was there missing.
That ingredient was the determination by the Comptroller or the Court that the move was motivated by the objective of evading and circumventing legislative policy.
Had that determination been made, as it was here the
basis of the Attorney General's opinion, we have no doubt
but that the Mississippi Court, like other courts we have
referred to above, would have refused to give its approvd.
The Howard case was concerned with a statute far
diITerent from ours. The New Jersey statute provides that
the Commissioner shall approve a branch application if
he determines that the public convenience would be
served, and the proposed operation has reasonable promise of successful operation. Thus, in New Jersey, after
these criteria have been found, it is not only a matter of
legislative policy, but the statute expressly declares, that
the branch be granted. No contention was urged, and no
determination was made that the application was motivated by improper objectives. All that was involved was
whether the Commissioner abused his discretion in finding the essential criteria existed.
Further than that, and at the other end of the spectrum, is the case of In re Princeton Bank, cited by us
supra, wherein the same New Jersey court in a later deci-
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sion, and upon a finding that what the bank did was a
device designed to circumvent the law, ref used to sanction the attempt.
We submit, accordingly, that the opm1on of the
Attorney General reflects sound principles of la\v in the
light of st::i.tutory limitations upon the establishment of
branch banks. The thrust of his opinion, as previously
noted, is that the legislature has effectively closed certain
geographic areas to the establishment of de novo branch
banks. That these closed areas include, insofar as Davis
and Weber Counties are concerned, the unincorporated
portions of those counties, plus the municipalities in
which there is already located a unit bank. That the legislature has affirmatively declared a method whereby the
banking needs of these closed areas is to be met, namely,
through the establishment of new unit banks, -not by
branching. That legislative policy, as reflected in these
statutory limitations, is designed to protect existing unit
banks from the competition of branch banks, and to encourage the establishment of new unit banks to meet
growing banking needs, and that this legislative policy
is not to be frustrated by the establishment of branch
banks immediately adjacent to closed areas for the primary purpose of serving these closed areas and competing with existing unit banks therein.
Who can say that these conclusions so reached by
the Attorney General are not sound legally? Or that the
Bank Commissioner in following and applying them in
the discharge of the duties of his office acted unlawfully
and contrary to law?
Who can so say? The lower court so said, and that
is why we are here. For if a branch bank may lawfully
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be established, not for the purpose of serving the needs
of the community in which it locates, but for the primary
purpose and with the primary objective of serving an
adjacent area which the legislature has declared closed
to the establishment of branch banks, then the legislative
limitations on branch banking have been effectively frustrated and negated, as there is not a "closed" area in the
state that would not be subject to effective invasion by
branch banks. To what end has the legislature declared
Ogden City (and many other geographic areas) off limits
to the establishment of de novo branch banks, if branch
hanking can lawfully be conducted therein by the physical location of branch banks outside the limits of the forbidden areas, but immediately adjacent thereto?
We are not, of course, discussing the situation where
a lawfully established branch bank incidentally serves
customers living in other areas, which we acknowledge
as being entirely lawful. What we are dealing with is a
situation where a branch bank proposes to locate in an
area not closed to branching, not for the primary purpose of serving that area, and but incidentally serving
customers living or doing business elsewhere, but for the
primary purpose and with the primary objective of serving an adjacent area which the legislature has declared
closed to branching. It is this purpose and objective
which, under the Attorney General's opinion, renders unlawful the establishment of the branch in question.
We submit that the legal conclusions so reached by
the Attorney General are sound, and that the Bank Commissioner in adopting them as the basis for his decision
acted in accordance with law.

27

II.
THE DECISION OF THE BANK COMMISSIONER
WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW FOR REASONS
UNAFFECTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OPINION
As we briefly noted under Point I of our argument,
it was plaintiff's contention in the lower court (and concurrence therein is of necessity the basis for the lower
court's decision), that the statute lays down but three criteria, or "requirements" for the granting of a branch,
i.e., (I) the required capital, (2) public convenience and
advantage, and (3) its location in a municipality in which
there is then no unit bank or banks. Therefore, argued
the plaintiff, and so ruled the Court, since the Commissioner's Findings favorably covered these items, the plaintiff was entitled to the branch as a matter of law, and this
notwithstanding that the evidence disclosed that the
South Ogden location was sought, not for the purpose
of serving the needs and convenience of South Ogden, but
for the purpose of serving other geographic portions of
the Ogden Metropolitan Area which the legislature had
closed to branching.
On the other hand, the conclusion reached by the
Attorney General was that where the true purpose and
object of the applicant was not to serve the needs and convenience of the municipality in which it sought to locate, but to serve adjacent areas which the legislature has
closed to branching, then the application must be denied
as a matter of law.

These are the two extremes. The plaintiff contended, and the lower court ruled, that plaintiff was en-
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titled to the branch as a matter of law. The Attorney
General ruled that the application must be denied as a
matter of law. The defendants concur in the conclusions of the Attorney General, but also urge that the
e:..trcme position of the Attorney General need not necessarily be accepted as the basis for the ultimate decision
in this case. This by reason of the fact that it is not the
opinion of the Attorney General that is here under revie\\·, but rather the question of whether the decision of
the Bank Commissioner in denying plaintiff's application
for a South Ogden branch was a lawful decision. If the
Court accepts the ruling of the Attorney General as
sound, the denial of the application by the Bank Com·was obviously "in accordance with law", and
that is the end of this case. But on the other hand, if
the conclusion of the Attorney General is not accepted,
then the decision of the Bank Commissioner can be said
to be "not in accordance with law" only if this Court
accepts plaintiff's thesis that once the three statutory
criteria are shown to exist the applicant is entitled to its
branch as a matter of law. This simply cannot be if the
statute is to be given any effect whatever.
As we further noted under Point I, the statute vests
the Commissioner with a broad discretion in granting or
denying branches, subject, of course, to legislative limitations and restrictions embodied in the three criteria.
When the evidence is such as to support a finding that
these three conditions of proper capital, public convenience, and no existing unit bank have been met, the law
does not require that the Commissioner's discretion be
directed in but the single channel of approval, as that
would negate any exercise of discretion. Many reasons
may exist why the Commissioner in the exercise of his
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discretion may and should deny the branch. Without
attempting to be all inclusive, we suggest several sound
reasons why the Commissioner in any given case may
properly and lawfully deny an application for a branch,
even after he has determined that the applicant has O)
proper capital, (2) that public need and convenience
would be served and ( 3) there is no existing unit bank
in the municipality in which the branch is to be located.
For example, the Commissioner may determine that
the plan of operation of the proposed branch is not in
accord with sound banking practice. Or that the branch
will be understaffed. Or that the individuals proposed
to manage the branch are not sufficiently experienced.
Or that the interests and the needs and convenience of
the area would be better served through the establishment
of a new unit bank, instead of the branch. Or that another location would be more suitable. Or that, as in the
instant case, that the applicant was not really interested
in the South Ogden location as such, or in serving South
Ogden, but rather sought the branch for the primary
purpose of serving Ogden, Clearfield, Layton, Kaysville,
and other portions of Weber and North Davis Counties
in which the legislature had denied it the legal right to
locate. Each of these examples provide sound reasons
why, in any given case, a branch application may properly be denied from a purely discretionary standpoint,
notwithstanding the existence of the three criteria above
mentioned.
Thus, the essence of this point of our argument is
that it is the decision of the Bank Commissioner in denying the branch that is under review, and not the validity
of the Attorney General's opinion. Section 7-1-26, U.C.A.
1953, vests the reviewing court with power to set aside a
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decision of the Bank Commissioner which the Court determines to be "not in accordance with law". The lower
court, in entering its judgment herein setting aside the
decision of the Bank Commissioner for the reason that
the decision was "not in accordance with law", and in
directing the Commissioner to issue a new decision granting the application, can be supported only upon the premise that a decision approving the application was the
only decision the Commissioner could lawfully make.
This cannot be, as such reasoning effectively deprives the
Commissioner in all cases of any discretion in the matter of approving branch banks.
The cmclusion of the Attorney General may be
deemed to be entirely wrong, yet the decision of the Bank
Commissioner, i.e., the denial of the application, be entirely rigbt, proper and lawful. The decision of the Bank
Commissioner does not stand or fall upon the acceptability of the Attorney General's opinion, but upon the
question of whether it \Vas, in its final analysis, a decision which he could lawfully make.
W c submit, accordingly, that the denial of the application was a decision that the Bank Commissioner
muld Ia,d ully make, and this irrespective of the acceptability of the opinion of the Attorney General. Since it
was a decision he could lawfully make, the lower court
erred in setting it aside on the grounds that it was contrary to law.

III.
TI IE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AS 11-IERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACTS LEFT UNRESOLVED
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Plaintiff, by its complaint in the lower court, sought
a declaratory judgment that the decision of the Bank
Commissioner be declared erroneous and not in accordance with law, that such decision be set aside, that its
application for the branch in South Ogden should have
been granted, and that the court direct the Bank Commissioner to grant the application forthwith. <R U.
The complaint, and the ruling sought thereby, was predicated upon the narrow ground that,
"8. Said opinion (Attorney General's) and the
decision of the defendant <Brimhall) which
adopted said opinion is erroneous as a matter of
law in that the branch banking statutes permit a
branch bank to be located in any city or town in
which a unit bank is not located." <Par. 8 of Complaint, R. 3).
The answer of the Bank Commissioner denied generally the alleged unlawfulness of his decision, and denied particularly the allegations of Paragraph 8, supra.

(R. 14.)

The answer of the defendant banks denied generally
the allegations of said Paragraph 8, denied the alleged
unlawfulness of the Bank Commissioner's decision, and
additionally raised the defenses,
I) that the finding of the Bank Commissioner
that the public convenience and advantage
would be promoted and subserved by the establishment of the proposed branch was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and
not in accordance with law, in that it was
wholly without support in the evidence, and,
2) that the Bank Commissioner failed to find that
the public convenience and advantage of that
portion of the public comprising South Ogden
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would be in any way promoted or subserved
by the establishment of the proposed branch
(R. 19, 20)'
Thus the answers collectively raised the defenses of
( 1) the lawfulness of the decision from an over-all standpoint, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
Commissioner's general finding of public convenience
and advantage as compared to a finding of public convenience and advantage specifically related to the municipality in which the branch is to be located. All of these
defenses obviously relate to the lawfulness of the decision
under attack, and the latter two particularly for the reason that if either is valid there is then an absence of one
of the three criteria even plaintiff acknowledges to be
essential to support an approval of the application-in
which event the Commissioner's decision denying the
application was the only decision that lawfully could be
made.
Following the filing of the answer of defendant
banks, the plaintiff moved to strike therefrom the defense
that the general finding of the Bank Commissioner on
the question of public convenience and advantage was
not supported by the evidence, and as ground of its motion asserted,
"that the quoted portion of said answer is an improper and insufficient defense and immaterial to
the determination of the above entitled cause."
<R. 42.)
Plaintiff's argument to the lower court in support of
its motion to strike was to the effect that plaintiff had
framed its complaint for review upon the narrow ground
of the alleged invalidity of the Attorney General's opinion; that the lawfulness of the Bank Commissioner's deci-
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sion was to be judged solely from the standpoint of that
opinion; that the issues were restricted to the single issue
so raised by plaintiff; and that there was and could be no
defenses of the type pleaded by the defendant banks.

<R. 43.)

The lower court accepted plaintiff's views on the
matter, granted plaintiff's motion to strike, and thus removed from the case any question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify the relief plaintiff itself was seeking.
The position of the defendant banks with respect to
this particular defense was, and now is, that it presented a defense directly related to the question of (I J
whether the decision of the Bank Commissioner was in
accordance with law, and (2) whether the plaintifI in
any event was entitled to the relief it sought. Not only
were the defendants entitled to raise this issue, but the
court was obliged to consider and pass upon it in its determination of the ultimate question of whether the decision
under review was a lawful decision.
The defense of insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of public convenience and advantage is a
valid defense in any proceeding to procure the establishment of a branch bank, but it was of particular significance here in the light of the gamut plaintiff's evidence
on the subject ran. Not only were the needs and convenience of the Ogden Metropolitan Area (of which South
Ogden comprises but a small fraction) to be served by
this branch, but the whole Wasatch front would be advantaged thereby (App. Ex I, Pg. 65). Beyond that, the
state as a whole would benefit generally (Tr. 84, 85).
The finding of the Commissioner upon the subject is
phrased in but the most general terms, as indeed it had
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be in the light of this evidence. His finding is (App.
V).
to

"The public convenience and advantage would be
subserved and promoted by the establishment of
such branch at the location proposed * * * ."
What public is the subject of this finding? Certainly
not South Ogden, as the plaintiff deemed South Ogden's
needs irrelevant. Is it the public comprising the Ogden
Metropolium Area? Or the Wasatch front? Or the state
as a whole?
It ·was the contention of the defendant banks that
the evidence on the subject of public need and convenience ,,·as so general and ephemeral as to be insufficient
to support any relevant affirmative finding thereon. If
the evidence was indeed insufficient, as so contended, that
was an end to plaintiff's case, because a denial of the
brnncli under that circumstance was the only decision
the Commissioner could lawfully make.
In this connection we again call attention to the fact
that Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, which vests the lower
court with authority to review decisions of the bank commissioner, vests the court with power to set aside any
such decision only upon a determination that the decision is "not in accordance with law". How can the court
determine whether a decision of the bank commissioner
is unlawful unless it first permits parties affected by the
decision to advance reasons supporting its lawfulness as
well as its alleged unlawfulness? And equally important,
hmv could the lower court rationally determine whether
the plaintiff was entitled to a contrary decision, except
as it permitted inquiry into the question of plaintiff's
entitlement to a contrary decision?
35

There can be no doubt but that a denial of the application was the only lawful decision the Bank Commissioner could have made if, as contended by defendant
banks, there was no evidence to support a relevant finding of public convenience and advantage. The Commissioner may have assigned the wrong reason as the basis
for his decision, but nevertheless the decision was fundamentally and inherently lawful and right if this issue so
raised by defendants proved true.
Accordingly, defendants submit that the lower court
erred in striking the defense challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a finding of public convenience
and advantage, and thereby foreclosing the defendant
banks of the opportunity of advancing it. This defense
raised a genuine issue of fact upon the question of plaintiff's entitlement to the relief sought by it, and upon
which the defendants were entitled to be heard. The
lower court erred in striking such defense and in thus
depriving defendants of this defense.

IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING IN
ITS JUDGMENT AN ORDER TO THE BANK COMMISSIONER THAT PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION
FOR A SOUTH OGDEN BRANCH BE APPROVED.
In addition to setting aside the present decision of
the Bank Commissioner, the lower court included in its
judgment an order to the Bank Commissioner that he
grant the application of plaintiff for a South Ogden
branch. Defendants contend that this portion of the
judgment is clearly in excess of the lower court's power
and authority.
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, under which this action
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was hrought, vests the court with the limited authority
to "set aside" an existing decision of the Bank Commissioner which the court determines to be not in accordance with law. This is the measure and extent of its
power. No authority is granted the court to direct the
Commissioner as to what his new decision may be. This
c;ise provides an excellent example of why the ultimate
decision of whether to grant or deny this application must
still be with the Commissioner, and not with the court,
but subject to the court's right again to review the lawfulness of the new decision-whatever it may be.
Here the Commissioner denied the application as a
matter of law, because that is what the Attorney General
told him to do. He considered the evidence to the extent
of making findings with respect to the three statutory
conditions, but in the light of the Attorney General's
opinion he was not called upon to consider the merits of
the application from the standpoint of the discretionary
powers vested in him. The lower court has now determined that the decision of the Commissioner is to be set
aside because it was contrary to law, but in so holding
the Court has only determined that the Commissioner
was wrong in following the Attorney General's advice
and denying the application as a matter of law. Thus, if
the Commissioner was wrong in following the Attorney
General's ruling, the case must go back to the Commissioner for a new decision granting or denying the application on its merits and from a factual standpoint, but
disregarding the opinion of the Attorney General.
What that new decision may be, must in the first
instance be with the Commissioner. The fact that the
present decision denying the application on the basis of
the Attorney General's opinion is held to be contrary to
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law doesn't mean that the new decision must grant the
application. Many reasons may exist why the application should yet be denied on its merits. We have already
suggested one such reason: namely, that the objective of
the plaintiff in seeking this branch at this location frustrates and defeats legislative policy in its geographical
limitations on branching. While the lower court has held
that this factor alone is not sufficient to justify denial of
the branch as a matter of law, we do not understand that
the lower court has held that this is a circumstance which
may not be weighed by the Commissioner, along with
others, in the exercise of his ultimate discretion.
Let us suggest another reason why the court must
permit the Commissioner a further look at this application, rather than for the Court to attempt to dictate its
disposition.
Nearly a year has now passed since the Commissioner conducted his hearings. The case then made by
the plaintiff for the branch, considered in its most favorable light, was that the economy of the Ogden Metropolitan Area, consisting of Weber County and North Davis
County, was such that it required additional banking
services of the type the plaintiff would provide, and that
the proposed South Ogden location would provide a suitable base for the establishment of its facility. That from
such a location plaintiffff would draw upon the economy
of North Davis County and the whole of Weber County,
and such draw would make the operation of the branch
at the South Ogden location economically feasible. This
is the essence of the Commissioner's findings on the subject, and for the purpose of this point of our argument we
accept them as having support in the evidence. We also
disregard for the moment the fact that a major portion
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of the Ogden Metropolitan Area has been declared to be
off-limits to the location of branch banks.
This was the factual situation a year ago, as outlined and testified to by plaintiff. But what is it now?
How, if at all, has it changed? The fact is that now it's a
whole new ball game, and the Commissioner of necessity
must have an opportunity of re-examining it. A year ago
the plaintiff intended to support its South Ogden branch
by drawing upon the whole Ogden Metropolitan Area8.n area in which it was not presently represented. However, since the hearings a year ago, the plaintiff has filed
with the Commissioner, and the Commissioner now has
pending, plaintiff's application for a branch in Roy,
which, if granted, would effectively cut off North Davis
County and a substantial portion of Weber County from
the arerr proposed to be served by the South Ogden
branch, and from the area from which the South Ogden
branch would draw for its economic support.
Can the Ogden Metropolitan Area support two new
branches by plaintiff, one in South Ogden and one in
Roy? Do the needs and convenience of the public justify
two branches? If not, which should be granted, and
which should be denied? Or should both be granted, or
both denied? These are the factual questions to which
the Commissioner must give his personal attention to the
end of discharging the duties of his office.
We submit, accordingly, that the portion of the
judgment of the lower court which constitutes an order
to the Bank Commissioner to grant plaintiff's application
for a South Ogden branch must in any event be vacated
and set aside.
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CONCLUSION

It is a basic rule that statutes are to be construed to

give effect to legislative intent and policy. The legislative
policy of our present statutes restricting and limiting
branch banking is clear-to protect existing unit banks
from the competition of branch banks, and to promote
banking competition through the establishment of new
unit banks. The reason behind this policy was suggested
by this court in Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, supra., as being the legislative belief that unlimited branch
banking was not in the public interest. The statutes must
be construed to implement this policy. Thus, a scheme
to place a branch immediately across the boundary from
a city in which it is prohibited by law from branching,
with the primary object of serving the prohibited area
and thus competing with unit banks therein, must be
declared, as the Attorney General did declare it, an unlawful subterfuge. It may be, as some contend, that our
branch banking laws are old-fashioned and out-moded
and that they should be changed. Such contentions
should, however, be addressed to the legislature instead
of the courts.
The sum and substance of the Attorney General's
opinion was simply this:

If the Bank Commissioner concludes from the evidence before him that the primary objective of plaintiff
in seeking to establish a branch in South Ogden is not
to serve the needs and convenience of South Ogden, but
rather to provide a facility to serve Ogden, where it is
prohibited by law from locating, and effectively competing in Ogden with the unit banks situate therein, then
the establishment of the proposed branch under such cir40

cumstances, would not be in accord with legislative policy and would be unlawful. We submit that the legal
conclusion so reached by the Attorney General is sound,
and that the Bank Commissioner in adopting it as the
basis of his decision in this case did not act contrary to
lc:nv.

While defending the opinion of the Attorney General and
its soundness, we carry the argument a
step furthci to meet the exigencies of the present case-for the ultimate question before the Court is not whether
the conclusions so reached by the Attorney General are
sound, but whether the decision of the Commissioner was
in accordance with law. If the opinion of the Attorney
General is rnund, then obviously the decision of the Bank
Commissioner is in accordance with law, and that is an
end of the matter. On the other hand, if the Court determines that the opinion of the Attorney General is not
sound, there still remains the ultimate question to be
decided-Was the decision of the Bank Commissioner in
accordance with law? We say it was, because even if the
objective and intent of the plaintiff to frustrate the law
does not provide a basis for denying the application as a
matter of law, it is nevertheless a factual circumstance to
he considered from the standpoint of the Commissioner's
broad discretionary powers, and provides adequate support for the Commissioner's denial of the application.
We submit, accordingly, that the opinion of the
Attorney General is legally sound, but whether it is sound
or not, the act of the Bank Commissioner in denying the
applicant was a lawful act and not subject to being set
aside by the court as being "not in accordance with law."
Two additional grounds are presented for setting
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aside the judgment of the lower court, ( 1) that the lower
court erred in granting summary judgment, as there were
genuine issues of fact to be decided, and (2) the lower
court was in error in ordering the Bank Commissioner to
grant plaintiff's application, as such an order was in excess of the lower court's powers.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON ROMNEY

Attorney General

H

WRIGHT VOLKER

Assistant Attorney General

For W. S. Brimhall,
Commissioner of Financial Institutions
DAVID

S.

KUNZ

For Bank of Utah and
Bank of Ben Lomond
NEIL

R.

OLMSTEAD

of

OLMSTEAD, STINE AND CAMPBELL

For Commercial Security Bank
MAX D. LAMPH

For Citizens National Bank
DoN

B.

ALLEN

For First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
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APPENDIX
STATE OF UTAH
Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions
Salt Lake City
In the Matter of the Application of
WJlkcr Bank & Trust Company for
Permission to Establish a Branch
Bank in the vicinity of 36th Street
and Washington Boulevard,
South Ogden, Weber County, Utah

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS AND
ORDER

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. That on March 21, 1968, Walker Bank & Trust Company, 175
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, filed with the Commissioner of Financial Institutions its application for permission to establish a branch bank in the vicinity of 36th Street
and Washington Boulevard, South Ogden, Weber County,
Utah, using a branch bank application form prescribed by the
Commissioner.

2. That the Commissioner had notice of the above application
mailed to all banks in Weber County and others, and he had
notice of the application published in three successive issues
of the Ogden Standard-Examiner, beginning March 29, 1968.
3. That written protests to the granting of this application were
received from the Commercial Security Bank, the Bank of Ben
Lomond, the Bank of Utah, the North Davis Bank, the First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and the Clearfield State Bank.
4. That the Commissioner called a public hearing for consideration of this application to be held in Room 313, State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah, at 10:00 A.M. on the 29th day of April,
1968. He had notice of the hearing mailed to all unit banks
from Salt Lake County to the north end of the State and published notice of it in three successive issues of the Ogden Standard-Examiner, beginning April 23, 1968. The hearing was
held as noticed and was continued on April 30 and on motion
App. I

of the protestants, it was continued to May 13, 1968, on which
date it was concluded.
5. That Counsel representing applicant Walker Bank & Trust
Company at the hearing was Mr. H. R. Waldo, Jr. Counsel
representing protestants at the hearing were: Neil R. Olmstead for Commercial Security Bank, David S. Kunz for Bank
of Utah, Max D. Lamph for Citizens National Bank, Raymond
W. Gee for Clearfield State Bank, and Don B. Allen for First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. Others who had filed written
protests to the application were not represented at the hearing.

6. That written briefs were filed with the Commissioner by attorneys for both the applicant and the protestants.
7. That Walker Bank & Trust Company is one of the oldest and
largest state chartered banks in the State of Utah. Its main
office is in Salt Lake City and it has twelve branches in Salt
Lake County (eleven of which are presently operating) and
branches in Price, Provo and Logan which are presently operating.
8. That Sou th Ogden City is a city of the third class and there
are no banks (as distinguished from branches of banks) located
within the city limits of said City. There is no city of the first
class in Weber County.
9. That applicant bank has capital and surplus of not less than
$60,000 for each branch it is presently operating and an additional $60,000 of such capital and surplus for the proposed
branch (Exhibit 12).
10. That the proposed branch would be located on a parcel of land
fronting on Washington Boulevard near the corner of 36th
Street and such parcel of land is entirely within the city limits
of South Ogden City, Weber County, Utah.
11. That there are within the city limits of South Ogden City a
branch of the Bank of Utah, a branch of Commercial Security
Bank and a branch of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. Other
banks and branches in the Ogden Metropolitan Area, the dates
such banks or branches were organized or established and the
distance of such banking facilities from the proposed branch of
App. II

l

applicant are as shown on Page 57 of Exhibit I, Table 111-3.
All of such banks and branches (excepting only the proposed
Bank of Northern Utah and the Syracuse Branch of The First
National Bank of Layton, neither of which banking facilities
are operating) have operated from the locations indicated a
sufficient period of time to have an established business at such
locations and all of such banks and all of the banks operating
such branches are financially stable and secure institutions.
Existing banks have been able to compete successfully with
other financial institutions, (Tr. 306-309) and new banks have
in recent years been able to enter the area, become established
and increase their loans and resources without preventing the
other banks from increasing their loans and resources also
(Exhibit I, Chapter III, pp. 51-64; Tr. 65-73, 230-234, 315317, 349-350).
12. That the proposed branch would supply the full range of banking services offered by the applicant bank in its other banking
offices including drive-in tellers windows, safe-deposit boxes,
checking and savings accounts, the Walker Bankard (a bank
credit card service) and access to the trust department operations of the applicant bank (Tr. 204). In addition, the applicant bank, being essentially a statewide bank, would offer services to its customers in facilitating inter-branch and betweencity banking transactions (Tr. 158).
13. That the applicant bank has a lending limit to any one person
or corporation of approximately $2,800,000 (Tr. 204). In the
Ogden Metropolitan Area only First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A., has a larger lending limit and the other banks in the
area have limits of $800,000 or less (Tr. 81). The ratio of
banking h.cilities to population indicates that there are fewer
banking facilities in the Ogden Metropolitan Area to serve the
population than in the State as a whole (Exhibit I, p. 56; Tr.
67, 108-113).
14. That applicant bank has a number of existing customers having
offices or places of business in or serving the Ogden Metropolitan Area. (Tr. 150-162, 210, Ex. 7).
15. That the financial condition and history of the applicant bank,
App. III

and the management demonstrate its capacity to successfullv
manage and operate the proposed branch.
·
16. That applicant contends the economic effect of the proposed
branch and its sources of business would include all of the
South Ogden City, Ogden City and other cities and towns and
unincorporated areas of Weber County and of North Davis
County (which area is referred to for convenience as the Ogden
Metropolitan Area) (Tr. 33, 68, 96-97, 118-119, 137-138 236
344-345). The Ogden Metropolitan Area is for many
a single economic and trade area with Ogden as its major city.
This Area has experienced a substantial growth in recent years
as measured by wages, employment, income and assessPd valuation (Ex. 1, pp. 7-50, Ex. 2, 3, 4, and 5; Tr. 34-62, 89-92,
113, 318-331, 349). Population has increased su bstan ti ally
(Ex. 1, pp. 11-12, 15-17, 38-44; Tr. 40-42, 44-45, 54-58) and
estimates of future population for the Area indicate a substantial growth, with particular growth in the southeast and southwest portions of Weber County (Ex. 1, pp. 23-30; Tr. 21-26,
252-256). Growth of the economy in the future is likely to
continue (Ex. 1, p. 13, 46; Tr. 74).

17. That protestants contend that establishment of the proposed

branch bank would circumvent the branch banking law of the
State, because the primary objective of applicant in seeking
this location is not to serve the needs and convenience of South
Ogden, but rather to provide a facility that will compete 'With
the banks in Ogden City.
CONCLUSIONS

I. Due notice of the receipt of this application has been given as
required by law and a hearing was held as permitted by law.

2. The applicant bank has the necessary capital and surplus to
permit the establishment of an additional branch bank.

3. The Commissioner finds that, because of the substantial economic growth in the Ogden Metropolitan Area in recent years,
increased competition from the proposed branch bank would
not unreasonably interfere with the operation of the existing
banks and branches which are located in this area. It would
App. IV

not jeopardize the depositors of such banks, would not interfere with the ability of these banks to maintain their financial
strength and would not impair their ability to compete with
the applicant bank and other banks.
The vitality of this area is demonstrated by: per capita wages
in 1967 of $2,100, when the per capita wage level for the State
<lS a whole was $1,700, and the level of per capita wage receipts
in the Ogden Metropolitan Area has consistently been above
that for the State as a whole for the years 1960 through 1967.
During this period there was a growth in population in the
Area of 223 as against a growth in population in the State as
a whole of 163.
In 1%7, the Area had a population per banking office of 8,333
people and the State as a whole had a population per banking
office <1 t that time of 6,247.

4. The public convenience and advantage would be subserved

and promoted by the establishment of such branch at the location proposed and there is no reason to limit the character of
work or service to be performed at such branch. Applicant
hdnk h,is a number of existing customers having offices in or
places of business serving the Ogden Metropolitan Area. Furthermore, the general public would be afforded the choice of
another banking facility with substantially larger lending limits than any other state bank in the area if the proposed branch
bank is established.

5. The Attorney General of the State of Utah in an opinion of
law to the Commissioner dated August 15, 1968 (No. 68-055),
a copy of which is attached hereto, has ruled that as a matter
of law a branch bank may not be established by the applicant
bank at the location proposed and the Commissioner deems it
proper to follow such opinion and, accordingly, deny the application on the basis of the ruling of law set forth in the Attorney
General's opinion.
Based upon the foregoing conclusion of law, the Commissioner
of Financial Institutions hereby makes the following
App. V

ORDER
The application of Walker Bank & Trust Company for permission to establish a branch bank in the City of South Ogden,
Weber County, Utah, in the vicinity of 36th Street and Washington Boulevard is denied.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 9th day of September,
1968.

W.

s.

BRIMHALL

Commissioner of Financial Institutions
State of Utah

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH
OPINION OF LAW
No. 68-055
Requested by W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Utah Financial
Institutions.
Prepared by Attorney General Phil L. Hansen and staff.
QUESTION
Should the Commissioner of Utah Financial Institutions find
that the public convenience and advantage would not be subverted,
may a branch bank be lawfully established within the corporate
limits of South Ogden, Utah, a city of the second class in which
no unit bank is located, but which is immediately adjacent to Og·
den, Utah, another city of the second class in which are presently
located five unit banks, where it is shown by the evidence that the
primary objective of the branch bank is not to serve South Ogden,
Utah, in which it is physically to be located, but rather to serve
Ogden, Utah?
CONCLUSION
No.
App. VI

OPINION
This opinion is given in response to a letter dated August 14,
1968, and as a supplement to and to clarify Utah Attorney General Opinion No. 68-045, which was issued on the 26th day of
July, 1968.
The primary legislation restnct10ns in the establishment of
branch banks in the State of Utah are:
Except in cities of the first class, or within unincorporated
areas of a county in which a city of the first class is located,
no branch bank shall be established in any city or town
in which is located a bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting a customary banking business, unless
the bank seeking to establish such branch shall take over
an existing bank. No unit bank organized and operating
at a point where there are other operating banks, state or
national, shall be permitted to be acquired by another
bank for the purpose of establishing a branch until such
bank shall have been in operation as such for a period of
five years.

* * * No bank shall be permitted to establish any branch
or office until it shall first have been shown to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner that the public convenience and advantage will be subserved and promoted by
the establishment of such branch or office.
From and after the effective date of this act no unit bank
and no branch bank shall be established or authorized to
conduct a banking business except as hereinbefore in section 7-3-6 expressly provided.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the Utah State Legislature has affirmatively declared that the geographical areas comprising municipalities in which a unit bank or banks are presently
located, other than cities of the first class, are not open to the establishment of branch banks, other than by the so-called "take over"
method, i.e., through the process of taking over an existing bank.
The Utah State Legislature has further declared by the foregoing
statutory enactments, that as additional banking facilities are
App. VII

shown to be required to meet the needs and convenience of such
an incorporated area, the Commissioner of Utah Financial Institutions may pro\ide for such additional facilities hy iwrmitting the
establishment of new unit banks therein, but it is abundantly clear
that such additional banking facilities may not be provided through
the establishment of branches.
The wisdom of the legislative policy in thus seeking to encourage the unit banking system, as compared to branching, may be
debatable in some circles, but its validity from the legal standpoint
is no longer open to question in Utah. Further, the same limildtions upon branching have been applied to national banks located
in Utah, as evidenced by the recent decisions of the United St3ks
Supreme Court.
This legislative policy as adapted to Utah serves a dual purpose. The first such purpose is to protect existing unit banks from
competition by out-of-city banks through the branching process.
The second such purpose is to promote the furnishing of banking
competition through the establishment of local unit banks.
It appears from the facts presented in connection with the
application of Walker Bank & Trust Company for a branch in
South Ogden, Utah, at a location just outside the boundaries of
Ogden, Utah, that the primary obj cc ti ve in seeking that location
is not to serve the needs and convenience of South Ogden, Utah,
but rather to provide a facility that will effectively compete with
the Ogden banks in Ogden, Utah.
Thus, the instant question resolves itself into a determination
of whether the legislative policy, as so reflected in the foregoing
statutes, and which policy is designed to protect Ogden, Utah, unit
banks and others in incorporated areas similarly situated from competition from out-of-city banks through branching, and which fixes
the method for providing additional competition as the same is
needed through new unit banks, may be evaded by the establishment of a branch by Walker Bank & Trust Company in South
Ogden, Utah; which establishment is sought, not with the nools
and convenience of South Ogden, Utah, as the determining factor,
but with competition with Ogden, Utah, unit banks in Ogden,
Utah, as its primary purpose.

App. VIII

It is the opinion of this office that the legislative policy may not
be cv:ided. Statutes are to be construed to give effect to legislative
policy and to implement legislative intent. The physical location
of a branch hank in South Ogden, Utah, and just across the
houndary line from Ogden, Utah, where it is prohibited by law
Jrnm loc:1ting, for the primary purpose of serving Ogden, Utah,
:11ccl rnmpciing with the unit hanks in Ogden, Utah, is obviously
"
designed to evade the law and render nugatory the
kgisl:itive intent. It is the opinion of this office that the establishnicnt of the branch under such circumstances would be unlawful,
:md the instant application should be denied.
Dated this 15th day of August, 1968.
Respectfully submitted,

L. HANSEN
Attorney General

PHIL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,

a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.
W. S. BRIMHALL, COMMISSIONER
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF
THE ST ATE OF UTAH, BANK OF
UTi\H, BANK OF BEN LOMOND,
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK, FIRST
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A.,
:me! COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
Defendants.

DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT
AND DECREE
Civil No. 182203

This matter having come on regularly before the above entitled court on the 10th day of December, 1968, pursuant to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the matter having been
fully argued and briefs having been submitted and the court determining that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that plaintiff is entitled to relief as prayed against the defendants
App. IX

and each of them as a matter of law and the court being fully
ad vised in the premises, now therefore,

IT IS HEREBY DECLARED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that the denial by the defendant W. S. Brimhall
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, of
application of Walker Bank & Trust Company for the establishment of a branch bank in the City of South Ogden, Weber County,
Utah (which decision was dated September 9, 1968) is hereby declared to be erroneous and not in accordance with law, that plaintiff's application for a branch bank at such location should have
been granted and that such decision, being unlawful, is hereby set
aside.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner oi
Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, be and he is hereby
ordered and directed to grant the application of plaintiff Walker
Bank & Trust Company for the establishment of a branch bank
in the City of South Ogden, Weber County, Utah.
Dated this 20th day of March, 1969.
BY THE COURT
M. HANSON
District Court Judge

STEW ART
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